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A Primer on Reserve Growth

This post was originally written by Rembrandt in 2006.
Will 730 billion barrels be added to the reserve pool from reserve growth between 1996 and 2025 as estimated by the United States Geological Survey?
This post is the third part in a three piece series about the phenomenon of reserve growth in found oil fields. Insight in future reserve growth, often attributed to technological advancement, is crucial in determining the peak of conventional oil production. Parts 1 and 2 can be found here and here.
What we learned in part 2 of this series is that the data with respect to reserve growth is utterly confusing. Nonetheless, we need an answer to the question what the future perspectives are for reserve growth in order to; 1) improve forecasting the peak in conventional oil production; 2) Increase the understanding of the future role of technology in the oil industry.

The United States Geological Survey has so far been the only institute which has published an estimate for future reserve growth.

In their World Petroleum Assessment from the year 2000 they estimated that reserves would grow with 730 billion barrels between 1996 and 2025.(612 billion barrels for conventional oil, 118 billion barrels for Natural Gas Liquids). By estimating past reserve growth in the US lower 48 a reserve growth algorithm was established. This algorithm of which the curve is shown below was then applied to the entire world. Delivering an estimate of 730 billion barrels.

Chart 1 - Source: USGS, Verma
The problem with this method is the way how crude oil reserves are reported in the US which has been described in detail in part 2. Because of the practice of reporting only proven reserves, the amount of reserve growth is very high in the US when compared to other regions. In addition several heavy/extra heavy oil fields such as the kern river oil field are included in the assessment, which showed huge reserve growth due to the advancement in steam technology necessary to dilute the oil to produce it in the middle of the 20th century. It is erroneous to apply reserve growth in such heavy/extra heavy oil fields with medium and light crude oil fields.
Thirdly applying onshore reserve growth to offshore and deepsea fields is certainly not an approach that gives a correct estimate. Based on these three issues, the figures presented by the USGS do not seem to have much value. The method used likely provides figures too inacurrate to be relied upon.
However, the USGS authors (Albrandt et al) have acknowledge a part of the problems outlined:
"There are several reasons why a reserve-growth function that is based on historical trends for oil and gas fields in the Lower 48 states could Overestimate world potential reserve growth:
Engineering criteria for reporting reserves of world oil and gas fields might, in general, be less restrictive than those for the United States, tending to increase known reserves and decrease the potential for reserve growth.
Reported reserves might be deliberatly overstated in some countries, reducing the potential for future reserve growth.
Large world oil and gas fields might tend to have more substantial development than U.S. fields prior to release of initial field-size estimates, leading to more accurate initial reserves estimates and reducing the potential for future reserve growth.(USGS WPA 2000, chapter AR)"
To see if these critical remarks on their study held any value the authors of the USGS study attempted to apply their function for reserve growth, as shown in graph 1, to other oil producing regions in the world. Several latter publications were published with respect to reserve growth in Volga-Ural (Verma et al., 2000), West Siberian Basin (Verma and Ulmishek 2003), the North Sea (Klett and Guatier 2003, 2005), the Middle East (Verma et al., 2004) and Canada (Beliveau, 2003; Verma and Henry, 2004). Their conclusion was that the reserve growth curve is indeed applicable to the entire world, given reserve growth patterns observed in these other regions. The one about Russia has been described in detail in part 2. These publications do not shed much light on the issue however as shown in part 2. Reserve growth varies in every region in the world. Applying a strict curve from one region towards others does not make much sense to me in the light of the highly chaotic variance in data. I therefore disagree that such a conclusion can be made, the USGS authors could be right, but they could also very well be wrong.
The International Energy Agency seems to disagree with this cautious vision on estimating reserve growth. In their recent resources to reserves report they noted the following about the USGS method and the criticism it received from ASPO:
"It should be noted that some authors (ASPO) argue that the "reserve growth" phenomenon is an artefact of very conservative United States reporting on proven reserves, which should not be applied worldwide, particularly in OPEC countries where some observers claim that published proven reserves numbers are suspicious (Simmons 2005). However, further studies by USGS geologists have pointed to reserve growth observed also in large fields outside the United States, at a rate consistent with the assumption of the 2000 Assessment (Klett 2003)." (IEA Resources to Reserves, 2006)
There is only one way to give a reasonable answer to what future path there is for reserve growth. The USGS takes the estimates from the IHS energy database (formerly petroconsultants) as a starting point. The updates in the IHS energy database therefore give excellent means for reviewing the forecast from the USGS. By looking at every change in the past decades in the IHS Energy database (formerly Petroconsultants) in meticulous detail an accurate answer can be found. Only then we will know what exactly bas happened in the past decades with oil reserves (proven and probable). There is only one problem, access to the database costs approximately 1 million dollars a year, a bit too expensive for a voluntary weblog. So the best we can do at the moment is by looking at the bigger trends that are available in public domain data.
In a publication from August 2005 in AAPG Bulletin (An evaluation of the USGS WPA 2000) the authors (Albrandt et al) conclude that approximately 28% percent or 171 billion barrels of the forecasted 612 billion barrels for conventional oil had been added to the reserve pool between 1996 and 2003.
In a presentation from 2004 one of the UGSS study authors (Klett) showed a graph depicting reserve growth in giant oil fields between 1981 and 1996 and 1996 and 2003:

Global Oil Supplies as Reported

  Global Oil Supplies as Reported

My post is mainly an update to Global Oil Supplies as Reported by EIA's International Petroleum Monthly for September 2010, based on data which the EIA reported in the past few days. I will also briefly present updated information regarding OECD and Non OECD oil supplies/consumption.

The stacked columns show crude oil and condensates supplies split among OPEC, Russia and ROW (Rest Of World which also includes OECD), from January 2001 through August 2010. The development in the average monthly oil price is plotted on the left hand y-axis. Note that world oil production has been on a plateau, from late 2004 to the present, with a small dip when prices dropped in late 2008 to early 2009. This graph considers crude and condensate only, excluding natural gas liquids and other forms of liquid energy, such as biofuels.
DISCLAIMER: The author holds no positions in the oil/energy market that may be affected by the content of this post.
NOTE: Scaling varies from chart to chart and some charts are not zero scaled. Labels indicate whether graphs are on an "all liquids" or "crude and condensate" basis.

Figure 01: The stacked columns in the diagram above show development in global supplies of crude oil and condensate, NGL and other liquid energy from January 2001 through August 2010. The development in the average monthly oil price is plotted on the left hand y-axis. NOTE: Diagrams based upon EIA data may be subject to future revisions.

Figure 02: The stacked columns shows crude oil and condensates supplies split among OPEC, Russia and ROW (Rest Of World; which also includes OECD), from January 2001 and as of August 2010. The development in the average monthly oil price is plotted on the left hand y-axis. Over the period covered by the graph (2001 to present), growth in Non OPEC supplies have primarily come from Russia. Oil supplies from the "Rest of World" (ROW) have not grown.
The long bumpy plateau from late 2004 to the present illustrates that huge swings in oil prices in recent years have had only a small impact on crude oil and condensate supplies.
EIA in their STEO (Short Term Energy Outlook) for November 2010 projected a slight decline in OECD and Russian petroleum supplies from 2010 to 2011, but a smaller decline than in the September STEO had shown. Under most circumstances, it could be expected that most of these declines would be offset by growth in OPEC supplies.

Figure 03: The diagram above shows development in OECD consumption of petroleum products between January 1990 and June 2010 together with the development in the oil price. In the recent months, petroleum consumption within OECD has seen some growth and this coincides with the recent growth in the oil price.

Figure 04: The diagram shows development in net oil imports for OECD from January 2000 through June 2010. This diagram shows that the recent oil price growth happened as OECD again started increasing oil imports. This is one of the indicators suggesting that the oil price now has strong support based on fundamentals.

Figure 05: The above diagram shows implied demand for liquid energy from Non OECD countries from January 2001 through June 2010. (I describe it as implied demand as the diagram shows the difference between total global supplies of liquid energy and OECD supplies (production + net imports)). Recently, demand for petroleum products from Non OECD seems to have leveled out as illustrated by the 3 MMA (3 Month Moving Average). (I use the 3MMA both to more easily identify seasonal variations and also to act as a “pilot” for trends over several months.)

Figure 06: The stacked columns show the split between OECD and Non OECD supplies of liquid energy from January 2001 through June 2010. The average monthly oil price is also plotted on the left hand y-axis. If we start with Figure 05 there clearly was a strong growth in demand from Non OECD starting early in 2009. From the diagram it shows the price grew with the demand growth from Non OECD. OECD demand was tanking at the time. To me this is a strong indicator that price in this period was driven by Non OECD demand.
As OECD production continues to decline, a growing need for imports into OECD (ref figure 04 in this post) is expected to add upward pressure to the oil price. Oil imports into OECD will normally tend to be higher during the heating season (winter in the Northern Hemisphere) and this suggests an upward pressure on the oil price in the months ahead.
Within a couple of weeks, I hope to post here on TOD an in-depth analysis that shows that at the current costs (as of first half of 2010), one can expect that in the U. S., an average annual oil price of $80 - 85/Bbl (Brent spot) results in GDP exclusive of energy expenditures that does not grow. This means that the present growth in U.S. GDP covers growing energy expenditures. Energy expenditures are costs for petroleum products, plus energy resources for non energy use (asphalt, coke, petrochemical feedstock etc.), natural gas and electricity).

Figure 07: The stacked columns show each OPEC member’s crude oil supplies and OPEC’s supplies of lease condensates and NGLs from January 2001 through August 2010. The average monthly oil price is also plotted on the left hand y-axis. The recent data from EIA shows a small growth in supplies of crude oil, condensates and NGLs from OPEC. (Lease condensates and NGLs are presently not part of OPEC's quota arrangements.)
To me, the recent growth in the oil price (adjusted for fluctuations in the value of the US Dollar) is a signal calling upon increased crude oil deliveries from OPEC.

Figure 08: The diagram above shows crude oil supplies from January 2001 through August 2010 for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. I believe most of present global spare marketable crude oil capacity is to be found amongst the 3 exporters presented above. Saudi Arabia increased their crude oil supplies by 300 kb/d between April and July of this year. It is not clear whether one can conclude that this caused some retreat in the oil price, but it is an interesting coincidence.

Figure 09: The stacked columns shows development in crude oil supplies from the 9 other OPEC members. The average monthly oil price is plotted on the left hand y-axis. Total crude oil supply from the 9 OPEC members above have remained relatively high and flat during the recent months, suggesting that these countries are pumping at maximum levels, regardless of price.
In summary, November's International Petroleum Monthly supports a continuation of the trends I had noted in my earlier post. In other words, world economies are still growing, putting more pressures on oil prices. By the end of 2011, my earlier analysis showed that the OPEC spare supply margin may be depleted. The next few months may be interesting ones!
SOURCES:
[1] EIA, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM MONTHLY, NOVEMBER 2010
[2] EIA, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY STATISTICS
[3] EIA, SHORT TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK, NOVEMBER 2010